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ABSTRACT 
INDIVIDUAL DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITIONS AND FINANCIAL HARDSHIP 
by 
Martin Erik Meder 
 
The University of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, 2018 
Under the Supervision of Professor Scott D. Drewianka 
 
 This dissertation consists of two essays on the relationship between 
individual demographic transitions, major life events that alter how an 
individual may be categorized by demographers, and financial wellbeing. 
Recent literature on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) has reported 
an absence of substitution behavior between SSDI and other social 
insurance programs, which is unexpected considering the observed 
countercyclicality of SSDI awards. In the first chapter, I decompose the 
increase in the SSDI enrollment rate over the period surrounding the Great 
Recession, finding that 54.9% of the increase in the enrollment rate can be 
attributed to individuals who did not previously identify as disabled. I then 
address the often-discarded possibility that recessions are themselves 
disabling, discussing evidence that the incidence of disabling conditions 
increased over the recessionary period. 
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Many changes in divorce policy have been grounded in the concern 
that divorce may cause financial hardship, especially among divorced 
women. Indeed, there is a well-documented correlation between financial 
hardships and divorce, but the direction of causality remains unclear: it is 
easy to imagine that divorce causes hardship, that hardship raises the risk of 
divorce, or that other factors may produce both outcomes. In the second 
paper, I specify a model that nests all three possibilities and can be 
estimated using standard limited dependent variable and simultaneous 
equation methods. Using instruments that have been used in prior work, I 
estimate the model on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 Cohort. After controlling for both selection and simultaneity, the 
structural estimates imply a clear causal structure: I find no evidence that 
hardship causes divorce, but the event of divorce decreases the 
income/needs ratio in divorced women’s households by approximately 0.32 
standard deviations. However, further evidence indicates that the causal 
effect of the divorce itself is partially obscured by a negative association 
between hardship and the risk of divorce, which appears to owe to 
anticipatory responses in women’s labor supply. Accounting for those 
anticipatory responses also reveals a negative structural error correlation 
between divorce and the income/needs ratio, suggesting some unobserved 
factors may produce both divorce and hardship.
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DECOMPOSING CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY INSURANCE AWARDS 
I. Introduction 
The relationship between Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) 
awards and the business cycle has received considerable attention in the 
literature. The basic problem is that SSDI is designed to insure workers 
against permanently disabling conditions, not to insulate workers from the 
business cycle. This intention is reflected by the very low rate of benefit 
termination, which, according to the 2015 Annual Statistical Report on the 
Social Security Disability Insurance Program (ASRSSDI), has fallen from the 
1982 retrenchment rate of 1.63% to a low of 0.72% in 2007, although it has 
since increased to 0.85% in 2015.  
To visually approximate the magnitude of the problem, Figure 1 plots 
the percentage change in the number of awardees and the percentage 
change in annual average unemployment rate from 1987 to 2015. Contrary 
to the intent of the program to insure workers against the risk of 
permanently disabling injury, the most important determinant of the number 
of SSDI awards appears to be how many workers were displaced that year. 
Indeed, Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2015) find that the increase in the 
unemployment rate over the Great Recession increased the number of SSDI 
applications by 6.7%. Overall, the number of awards has been growing at an 
average rate of 2.3% per year, spiking during recessions to as much as 
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18.7% following the 1990-1991 recession. Combined with the low rate of 
benefit termination, the SSDI program has grown to cover 10.24 million 
beneficiaries as of 2015, roughly 3.2% of the U.S. population (up from 1.4% 
at the time of the 1984 reforms), who received a total of $11.4 billion dollars 
in payments. While it is tempting to attribute these patterns to some form of 
malingering or fraud, prior work consistently finds that disability programs 
are appropriately targeted, and that even rejected applicants exhibit a 
diminished capacity for gainful employment that is entirely inconsistent with 
malingering (Bound 1989; Bound and Waidmann 1992; Maestas, Mullen, and 
Strand 2013). 
Given the cyclicality of SSDI awards, a natural assumption is that 
there must be some substitution by workers between SSDI and other social 
insurance programs; however, this does not appear to be the case.  In a 
recent paper, Mueller, Rothstein, and von Wachter (2016) find no 
relationship between the exhaustion of unemployment insurance (UI) 
benefits and the number of SSDI applications. Likewise, Autor and Duggan 
(2003) find no relationship between the UI replacement rate and receipt of 
SSDI. Contrary to expectation, these results suggest that SSDI is not being 
used as a substitute for UI (see Mueller, Rothstein, and von Wachter 2016 
for a detailed discussion). 
The apparent lack of substitution between UI and SSDI leaves the 
literature at something of an impasse. Our objective here is to decompose 
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the populations enrolling in SSDI to evaluate which claims presented in the 
literature have empirical support as a potential cause of the observed 
cyclicality in SSDI awards, resolving this impasse and suggesting a way 
forward. To that end, this apparent lack of substitution reduces the number 
of testable hypotheses for the countercyclicality of SSDI awards to three. 
The first is that disabled individuals, who are displaced by the recession, are 
exiting the labor force and seeking SSDI. The second hypothesis is that 
Autor and Duggan’s (2003) conditionally attached workers are responsible: 
that low-skill individuals who were previously working, and who are in 
generally poorer health but not necessarily disabled, upon displacement 
from the labor force choose to seek SSDI instead of seeking work, and are 
more likely to do so when the costs of seeking work are relatively high. The 
third possibility, which has been neglected in the SSDI literature, is that 
recessions are themselves disabling.  
To determine which of these hypotheses are supported by observed 
trends in the SSDI enrollment rate, we perform Oaxaca-like decompositions 
of the increase in the enrollment rate during the Great Recession. This 
exercise eliminates two of the above possibilities. First, changes in the 
employment and labor force participation of initially disabled individuals only 
account for 7.4% of the observed increase in SSDI enrollment during the 
Great Recession. This finding suggests that any factor related to the labor 
force participation of existing disabled workers, such as the possibility of 
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increased labor market discrimination during recessionary periods, would 
have limited impact on SSDI program participation. Second, examining three 
proxies for conditionally attached workers, we find that this population 
cannot substantially account for the observed increase in SSDI enrollment. 
Finally, we find that 54.9% of the increase in the enrollment rate can be 
attributed to individuals who did not previously identify as disabled. While 
this result could support either of the latter two hypotheses, we provide a 
detailed discussion of the possibility that recessions are themselves 
disabling. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides a discussion of our 
data, section III presents the decomposition, section IV provides discussion, 
and section V concludes.  
II. Data 
The relatively small size of some of our populations of interest, such as 
disabled workers who pass through unemployment, necessitates the use of a 
very large sample. Our primary data source is the Annual Social and 
Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey (CPS). To 
provide coverage of the Great Recession and the ensuing recovery, as well 
as a relevant comparison period, our sample period is 2006 to 2012, which 
includes income and employment data from 2005 to 2011, as well as self-
reported labor force participation and disability status from 2006 to 2012.  
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To further ensure a sufficiently large sample size in each population 
cell of our decomposition, we divide the sample into two subsamples: one 
which covers a period in which the labor market was relatively strong, and 
one which covers a weaker labor market. These periods are defined using 
national total private employment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). 
The strong labor market period includes survey years 2006-2008, as by 
January 2005 total private employment had recovered to a pre-recession 
level of approximately 111 million, climbing to 116 million by December 
20071, the official start of the Great Recession. The weak labor market 
period includes the remaining survey years in our sample. 
In our analysis, we exploit the rotation group of the CPS ASEC. For our 
decomposition, we generate individual identifiers from household identifiers, 
age, sex, and line number, which yields a panel with two observations for 
each2 individual in the rotation group. This allows us to observe which 
individuals in the rotation group enroll in SSDI during their observation 
period. We define enrollment as receiving 0 social security income in the first 
period and greater than 0 social security income in the second.   
Since the CPS ASEC only reports Social Security income from all 
sources, we restrict this sample to non-institutionalized civilians aged 25-61 
                                                          
1 By March 2008, when the survey is conducted, total private employment had only fallen to 
approximately 115.8 million. 
2 Excluding those individuals who were last surveyed in 2006, or first surveyed in 2012. 
 6 
 
who are not widows3. We exclude individuals younger than 25 to avoid 
confounding dependent benefits and labor force non-participation from 
individuals still enrolled in school, and we exclude individuals over 61 to 
eliminate the possibility of early retirement in the event of the loss of a 
primary job4. For the purposes of our decomposition, we further exclude 
those individuals for whom we cannot infer labor force participation and 
unemployment status for the year preceding the survey, as well as those 
who do not self-report disability or labor force participation for the initial 
survey year. All those individuals for whom we observe only one year of data 
are also excluded, as we do not observe enrollment status for those 
individuals. These restrictions yield 101,563 observations for the strong 
labor market period, and 101,379 for the weak labor market period.  
III. Decomposition 
We begin with our decomposition of the change in enrollment rate. Let 
𝑋𝑡 denote a partition of the period t sample observations. Further let 𝑋𝑡𝑗 ⊂ 𝑋𝑡, 
such that 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}, with each subset containing 𝑛𝑡𝑗 elements 𝑥𝑡𝑗𝑖. Finally, 
let 𝑛𝑡 = ∑ 𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=1  be the number of individuals in the period t sample, and 𝜀𝑡𝑗𝑖 
be an indicator variable which equals 1 if an individual reports 0 social 
security earnings in the previous year and greater than 0 social security 
                                                          
3 While we are unable to identify those divorced spouses who are eligible for enrollment in 
survivor benefits, claiming this benefit requires a qualifying disability or eligibility for 
retirement. 
4 Including these individuals may lead us to incorrectly conclude relatively strong 
attachment to the labor force among SSDI enrollees. 
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earnings in the current year. It follows that the enrollment rate in period t is 
given by 
𝜀𝑡 = ∑
𝑛𝑡𝑗
𝑛𝑡
∙ Pr(𝜀𝑡𝑗𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑡𝑗𝑖𝜖𝑋𝑡𝑗)
𝑘
𝑗=1
 
Performing an Oaxaca-like decomposition, this implies that the change in 
enrollment rate between an initial period 0 and a subsequent period 1 is 
given by 
𝜀1 − 𝜀0 = ∑([
𝑛1𝑗
𝑛1
−
𝑛0𝑗
𝑛0
] ∙
Pr(𝜀1𝑗𝑖 = 1|𝑥1𝑗𝑖𝜖𝑋1𝑗) + Pr(𝜀0𝑗𝑖 = 1|𝑥0𝑗𝑖𝜖𝑋0𝑗)
2
𝑘
𝑗=1
+
(
𝑛1𝑗
𝑛1
+
𝑛0𝑗
𝑛0
)
2
∙ [Pr(𝜀1𝑗𝑖 = 1|𝑥1𝑗𝑖𝜖𝑋1𝑗) − Pr(𝜀0𝑗𝑖 = 1|𝑥0𝑗𝑖𝜖𝑋0𝑗)]) 
The first term in the above expression is the change in enrollment 
attributable to the change in the relative number of people in a subset, i.e. 
to the change in composition. The second term is the portion attributable to 
the change in probability that an individual in a given subset will enroll in 
SSDI, i.e. to the change in rates. 
We define the initial period as containing those individuals who were 
first observed during the strong labor market period. Likewise, the second 
period consists of those individuals who were first observed during the weak 
labor market period. We partition the individuals in each period over four 
characteristics. The first characteristic is imputed labor force participation 
status for the year preceding the first survey year in which the individual is 
observed. Individuals are assigned a labor force status if they report some 
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in-universe value for at least one of wage income, unemployment duration, 
or weeks worked, and are designated as having participated if any of these 
values are greater than zero. 
The other characteristics are whether an individual has reported some 
nonzero duration of unemployment in the year preceding their first survey, 
whether an individual identified as having a work-limiting disability during 
their first survey, and whether an individual who was identified as having 
participated in the labor force, when asked their labor force participation 
status the following March, indicated that they were no longer a participant. 
This partition yields ten subsets of interest, as two of the characteristics, 
unemployment status and labor force exit, are only relevant for individuals 
who were initially observed as participating in the labor market.  
IV. Discussion 
Table 1 presents the results of the decomposition. The total change in 
observed enrollment rate of 0.162 percentage points corresponds to an 
increase of 9.5%, which is close5 to the 9% year-over-year increase in 
number of awards reported by the Social Security Administration for 2008. 
Considering recent literature on the subject of enrollment in SSDI, 
many of the results of the decomposition are unsurprising. We focus on 
those results which support or conflict with our three hypotheses: that 
                                                          
5 Due to the aggregation of our annual data, these two measures are not entirely 
comparable. 
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displaced disabled individuals are exiting the labor force and seeking SSDI, 
that conditionally attached workers are responsible, or that recession is 
causing disability. We proceed by hypothesis. 
IV.a Displaced Disabled Workers 
From Table 1, we observe that the share of initially disabled workers 
who do not pass through unemployment inhibits the increase in the 
enrollment rate by nearly 24.1%, while the corresponding increase in the 
share of disabled workers who do pass through unemployment (a group 
which we would naturally expect to have relative high enrollment rates) only 
accounts for 3.1% of the observed increase in the enrollment rate. 
Considering that the increase in the share of disabled nonparticipants in the 
population accounts for 28.4% of the observed increase in the enrollment 
rate, changes in the labor force participation decision of these individuals 
who initially identify as disabled accounts for only 7.4% of the observed 
increase in enrollment, which is not very large. Consequently, any 
explanation for the increase in SSDI enrollment during recessions that 
operates through a change in the labor force participation or employment of 
workers who were already disabled, such as labor market discrimination, 
cannot account for much of the observed increase. 
IV.b Conditionally Attached Workers 
 Most strikingly, 97.5% of the observed increase in SSDI enrollment is 
attributable to labor-force non-participants. It is tempting to interpret from 
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this that workers following a conditional application strategy played a critical 
role in the expansion of SSDI enrollment during the Great Recession. 
However, due to the requirement that SSDI applicants not engage in 
substantial gainful activity during the application process, all but the lowest 
income enrollees must withdraw from the labor force prior to enrollment.  
Unfortunately, limitations6 in our data restrict our ability to decompose 
by cause of job loss, which would better inform our analysis of conditional 
applicants. Consequently, the hypothesis we examine here is not whether 
workers exhibited conditional attachment during the Great Recession. 
Rather, we examine if the workers most susceptible to the conditional 
attachment mechanisms identified by Autor and Duggan, i.e. workers in the 
lower tail of the income distribution for whom the increasing dispersion of 
permanent income has made SSDI relatively more attractive, are 
disproportionately responsible for the observed cyclicality in SSDI 
enrollment.  
 Table 2 presents three abridged decompositions which examine these 
groups. Following Autor and Duggan, we use high school dropouts as a 
proxy for these conditionally attached workers. We further consider income-
defined groups below 100% and 200% of the poverty level7. While the more 
                                                          
6 Reason for unemployment is only reported for individuals who indicated undergoing a span 
of unemployment. 
7 Some may be concerned here that household income is determined by the strength of the 
labor market, and that imputed household income should be used in place of reported 
values; however, who is actually moving into and out of impoverished condition is more 
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pertinent issue in determining whether a worker is likely to exhibit 
conditional attachment is low permanent income, the Great Recession was in 
part characterized by a tightening of credit markets, which would have 
hindered efforts to smooth consumption for those who temporarily found 
themselves at the lower tail of the income distribution.  
 While each of the three groups identified is more likely than average to 
enroll in SSDI, we see that none of them substantially account for the 
change in SSDI enrollment over the Great Recession. Those below 100% 
and 200% of the poverty level account for 17.7% and 34.7% of the total 
observed change respectively, while high school dropouts inhibit the increase 
in SSDI enrollment by 3%, which indicates that the individuals most 
responsible for the increase in SSDI enrollment over the Great Recession are 
those with traditionally strong labor force attachment. Furthermore, while 
the number of impoverished people increased during the Great Recession, 
these individuals are much less likely to enroll in SSDI than individuals who 
were impoverished prior to the recession. These findings suggest that this 
channel is not substantially responsible for the observed increase in SSDI 
enrollment during the Great Recession.  
One possible explanation for this is another factor discussed by Autor 
and Duggan: screening stringency. As we see in Figure 1, the increase in 
                                                          
relevant to the question at hand than who should be. Thus, we forego the use of imputed 
values. 
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SSDI enrollment during the Great Recession was mild relative to the change 
in unemployment. Indeed, Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2015) find evidence 
of increased stringency among SSDI examiners during economic downturns. 
This increased stringency during the Great Recession, a constriction in the 
supply of benefits, would have limited the contribution of conditionally 
attached workers to the increase in SSDI enrollment. 
IV.c Recessions as a Cause of Disability 
That 54.9% of the increase in enrollment can be attributed to those 
members of the population who do not initially identify as disabled suggests 
an alternative explanation. Assuming effective screening and that self-
reported disability status is an unbiased indicator of disability (see Benítez-
Silva et al. 2004), these are workers for whom disability status was not a 
determining factor in their labor force participation decision, but who 
suffered a disabling condition that was sufficiently incontrovertible to be 
granted SSDI within our observation period. This finding suggests that the 
most important factor driving the increase in SSDI enrollment during the 
Great Recession may have been individuals becoming disabled during the 
recession.  
Autor and Duggan largely dismiss this possibility as an explanation for 
increases in SSDI enrollment because the mortality rate has been decreasing 
over time, and yet they also note that low-mortality conditions are 
responsible for an increasing share of disability awards. It is therefore 
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possible to reconcile an increased rate of disability with a decline in 
mortality. Furthermore, even if the decreasing trend in the mortality rate did 
exclude the possibility that the incidence of disabling conditions is increasing 
over time, this trend has since reversed for middle-aged, White, non-
Hispanic workers (Case and Deaton, 2015).  
Likewise, Maestas, Mullen, and Strand (2015) also disregard this 
possibility as an explanation for the cyclicality in SSDI awards, noting the 
absence of evidence for the countercyclicality of severe disability. Again, as 
is noted in Autor and Duggan, the share of SSDI awards for low-mortality 
conditions has been increasing over time, and there is substantial evidence 
that the incidence of these low-mortality conditions, in particular mental 
illness, is countercyclical. For instance, a recent study by Mehta et al. (2015) 
found that the incidence of major depression in the National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Survey increased from 2.33% in the 2005-2006 
survey to 3.49% in the 2009-2011 survey. Concurrently, the incidence of 
other depression increased from 4.10% to 4.79%. These figures yield an 
increase in the incidence of all depression of 28.8% during the Great 
Recession. Ruhm (2015) reports the recent emergence of a countercyclical 
trend in deaths from accidental poisoning8 and suicide, which supports the 
possibility of an increase in depression or other mental illness over the 
recessionary period, as well as from neoplasms. Similarly, Dávalos, Fang, 
                                                          
8 A category which includes drug overdoses. 
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and French (2012) find that an increase in the unemployment rate is 
associated with an increase in the incidence of alcohol abuse and 
dependence. Charles and DeCicca (2008) find that worsening economic 
conditions increase weight gain, which is a cause of chronic musculoskeletal 
conditions, and reduce mental health among African American and low-
skilled workers. Finally, Bradford and Lastrapes (2014) find that a 1% 
decrease in employment and a 1 point increase in the unemployment rate 
are associated with a 10% increase in the number of prescriptions for 
anxiety and depression drugs. 
 Finally, that we observe an increase in the incidence of a disabling 
illness during recessions is not sufficient evidence to indicate that SSDI is 
functioning as intended. While we have argued for the countercyclicality of 
depression, individuals with recession-induced illness could conceivably 
recover once the recession passes, and there is no compensating 
procyclicality in the benefit termination rate. That is, we have individuals 
with a potentially temporary disability applying to, and enrolling in, a largely 
permanent disability program.  If recession-induced disability is driving 
enrollment in SSDI, a possible solution for preventing the substantial 
increases in total enrollment associated with recessions would be to flag 
these awards issued during recessions as “improvement expected”, which 
would require a medical review 6 to 18 months after the award.  
V. Conclusion 
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 Largely cyclical increases in the number of SSDI awards, combined 
with low rates of benefit termination, have increased the size of SSDI 
participation from 1.4% of the U.S. population at the time of the 1984 SSDI 
reforms to 3.2% of the U.S. population today. Considering the absence of 
substitution between SSDI and UI, we presented three hypotheses that 
could account for these increases. The results of our decomposition of the 
increase in the enrollment rate over the Great Recession and recovery 
conflict with explanations derived from the labor force participation decision 
or employment status of disabled workers, or those related to the presence 
of conditionally attached workers.  
We further found that 54.9% of the increase in the enrollment rate is 
attributable to individuals who did not previously identify as disabled, and 
discussed evidence that the incidence of disabling illnesses increased during 
the recessionary period. These findings suggest that the mysteries of cyclical 
increases in SSDI awards and a lack of substitution between SSDI and UI 
may not be mysteries at all: recessions may simply be making us sick.  
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SIMULTANEITY AND SELECTION IN FINANCIAL HARDSHIP AND 
DIVORCE 
I. Introduction 
It is well-documented that there exists a positive correlation between 
financial hardship and divorce. While divorce and financial hardship are well 
correlated, it is often unclear what the direction of causality is, and through 
which channels it operates. For example, divorce may cause hardship by 
eliminating opportunities to share household expenses or if the spouses rush 
to extract the assets that were previously held jointly, hardship could cause 
financial arguments that culminate in divorce, and it is easy to imagine that 
some personality traits (e.g., addiction, poor communications skills, 
irresponsible financial habits) could lead to both divorces and poor outcomes 
in the labor market or other financial difficulty. 
This paper investigates those competing hypotheses by estimating a 
structural model of divorce and financial hardship that nests many of the 
proposed channels. The empirical strategy involves both simultaneous 
equations methods (as suggested by Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977), 
Johnson and Skinner (1986), and Charles and Stephens (2004)) and 
corrections for selection on unobservables (as suggested by Dew, Britt, and 
Huston (2012), among others), and it can be estimated using standard 
latent variables methods. 
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Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
Cohort, we have four primary findings. First, we find no causal effect of 
income-based hardship on divorce. Second, we find that the event of divorce 
has a substantial negative effect on women’s financial well-being as 
measured by an income/needs ratio. Third, we find that women who expect 
an elevated risk of divorce can partially mitigate the effect of the divorce on 
their income/needs ratio through anticipatory or predicted reactive behavior, 
which appears to take the form of a modest labor supply response. Finally, 
after correcting for this effect of the propensity to divorce on future income, 
we find some evidence of negative selection on unobservables. That is, that 
some unobserved factor may be producing both divorce and financial 
hardship.  
In our policy extension, we further find that the negative financial 
consequences of divorce are substantially stronger for women who live in 
states where the divorce law both allows one spouse to end the marriage 
without the consent of the other (unilateral divorce) and does not presume 
that divorcing spouses share equal ownership of the family assets (non-
community property states). We also find that government transfer 
programs, in particular Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, are 
effective in mitigating the negative effects of divorce on women’s future 
income, and that the anticipatory labor supply response to an elevated 
divorce risk may reduce reliance on government transfer programs. 
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The discussion proceeds as follows. The next section reviews previous 
work on these issues. Section III then presents the behavioral and 
econometric model, and Section IV discusses the data. Section V presents 
the main results, Section VI presents a policy extension, and Section VII 
concludes with a summary and suggestions for further research. 
II. Literature Review 
In addition to being well-documented, the relationship between divorce 
and financial hardship is of substantial policy relevance. As reported by Bane 
and Ellwood (1986), 38% of the instances of poverty among female-headed 
households with children are attributable to the formation of that household 
through divorce. They further find that these spells of poverty tend to be 
longer in duration than those attributable to other sources, both for the 
women and for their children. A follow-up study by Stevens (1994) suggests 
that the consequences may have become more severe over time as well, as 
evidenced by their finding that the annual rate at which female-headed 
households exited poverty decreased over the 1980’s. 
Previous work has suggested many potential explanations for the 
observed correlation between hardship and divorce. In their seminal paper 
on the subject, Becker, Landes, and Michael (1977) theorize that the 
probability of divorce is increasing in husbands’ earnings and decreasing in 
wives’ earnings because greater specialization increases the gains to 
marriage. They then find evidence of such an effect among the white men in 
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the Survey of Economic Opportunity: the probability of divorce is decreasing 
in earnings up to an income of $40,000 in 1966 dollars. However, they 
caution that the direction of causality may run in both directions: that less 
specialization produces less stable marriages, and that those who expect 
their marriage to be less stable may specialize less. Evidence of this 
hypothesized anticipatory behavior has been found among women by 
Johnson and Skinner (1986), who find that women who get divorced tend to 
begin increasing their labor supply prior to the divorce. Note that such a 
response would reduce the impact of divorce on the women’s finances, but it 
would also suggest that the raw relationship may mask or understate the 
true effect of divorce on those for whom it comes as a greater surprise. 
Other studies present evidence that may suggest that hardship leads 
to divorce, though it almost always comes with the caveat that both may 
instead be the product of other factors. For example, Charles and Stephens 
(2004) find that job displacement increases the probability of divorce, but 
only when that job loss is due to a layoff, suggesting that the link between 
divorce and financial hardship may be through some omitted variable or 
through an information-updating mechanism. Likewise, Dew, Britt, and 
Huston (2012) find that even after controlling for other financial factors like 
income, assets, and wife’s share of household income, reports of arguments 
about finances and financial inequity within the household are associated 
with an increased probability of divorce, seemingly suggesting that the 
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statistical relationship is not entirely about financial resources. In another 
novel study, Francis-Tan and Mialon (2015) find that women who spent 
more than $20,000 on a wedding had a divorce hazard 3.5 times higher than 
those who spent between $5,000 and $10,000, identifying stress associated 
with wedding debt as a potential channel for divorce. However, it is also 
possible that couples who spend more on weddings may do so to 
compensate for lukewarm feelings about their union, or that their stress may 
ultimately owe more to chronic profligate spending than to a lack of income. 
Two notable studies have attempted to determine causality more 
definitively, and each shares some features with the present paper. Smock, 
Manning, and Gupta (1999) use an endogenous switching regression model 
similar to ours, though they estimate it on a different sample consisting of 
women who already reported being married in the first wave (1987-1988) of 
the National Survey of Families and Households. They find that those who 
had divorced before the second wave of that survey (1992-1994) had worse 
financial outcomes overall than those who remained married. However, their 
estimates also indicate that the divorced women would have had worse 
financial outcomes than the other wives if they had remained married, and 
that their financial outcomes in divorce were better than those that would 
have been expected for the wives who actually chose to remain married. 
The other particularly notable study is by Bedard and Deschênes 
(2005), who examine the causal relationship between women’s financial 
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hardship and divorce in data from the 1980 U.S. Census. They use the sex of 
a couple’s first child as an instrument for divorce; a series of earlier 
sociological studies (as well as Dahl and Moretti (2008)) had shown that 
divorce is more likely when the first child is a daughter. Their IV estimates 
imply that divorce is associated with an approximately $4,000 increase in 
household income, and they further note that ever-divorced women have 
greater hours and weeks worked per year than never-divorced women. This 
estimate combines two responses of potential interest: that of an increased 
risk of divorce, and the corresponding share of the effect of the realization of 
the divorce risk. Our estimates separate these effects into an effect of the 
propensity to divorce and a direct effect of divorce. 
III. Model 
III.a. Behavioral and Structural Model 
Define 𝐷 to be an indicator of divorce, 𝐻 to be a continuous measure of 
financial hardship, 𝑋 to be a vector of explanatory variables that determine 
both 𝐷 and 𝐻, 𝑍𝐷 to be a vector of variables that determine only 𝐷, and 𝑍𝐻 to 
be a vector of variables that determine only 𝐻. To allow for the possibility 
that financial hardship is affected by divorce, further let 𝐻0 be the potential 
hardship in the event that an individual remains married and 𝐻1 be the 
potential hardship in the event of divorce, with 𝜃 = 𝐻1 − 𝐻0. 
Consider a married individual who is deciding whether to remain that 
way. They may either choose to remain married and receive 𝑈0 =
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𝑈0(𝑋, 𝑍𝐷 , 𝐻0), or they may become divorced and receive utility 𝑈1 =
𝑈1(𝑋, 𝑍𝐷 , 𝐻1) ≈ 𝑈1(𝑋, 𝑍𝐷 , 𝐻0) + 𝜃𝜕𝑈1 𝜕𝐻⁄ . Let c denote the cost of divorce. It 
follows that an individual will divorce if and only if 𝐷∗ ≡ 𝑈1 − 𝑈0 − 𝑐 > 0. Taking 
Taylor approximations of 𝑈1 and 𝑈0 around points 𝑥1 and 𝑥0, letting ∆ be the 
differentiation operator, and using 𝜈1 and 𝜈0 to denote the effects of 
unobserved variables and approximation errors, we obtain 
𝐷∗ = [𝑈1(𝑥1) − 𝑥1 ∙ ∆𝑈1(𝑥1) − 𝑈0(𝑥0) + 𝑥0∆𝑈0(𝑥0) + 𝜃𝜕𝑈1(𝑥1) 𝜕𝐻⁄ − 𝑐]
+ (𝑋, 𝑍𝐷 , 𝐻0) ∙ ∆[𝑈1(𝑥1) − 𝑈0(𝑥0)] + (𝜈1 − 𝜈0)
= 𝛼𝐷 + 𝑋𝛽𝐷 + 𝑍𝐷𝛾𝐷 + 𝐻0𝛿 + 𝜀𝐷 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Note that the entire first line of equation (1) consists of constants 
which are subsumed into the intercept 𝛼𝐷. Since the effect of divorce on 
hardship, 𝜃, is also subsumed into that constant, only 𝐻0 is multiplied by the 
marginal utilities in the second line of equation (1)9. Equation (2) defines 
parameters (𝛼𝐷,𝛽𝐷,𝛾𝐷,𝛿) which correspond to their respective terms from 
equation (1), with 𝜀𝐷 ≡ 𝜈1 − 𝜈0. 
The model for the hardship equation may also be justified as a Taylor 
approximation. In addition to allowing hardship to be affected by a realized 
divorce outcome, 𝐷, we further allow the possibility that it is affected by the 
latent propensity to divorce represented by 𝐷∗. For example, Johnson and 
Skinner (1986) show that wives who anticipate divorce are more likely to 
participate in the labor force, which would reduce their household’s financial 
hardship whether or not the marriage ends in divorce. While our estimated 
                                                          
9 Identification of 𝛾𝐷 does not require constant 𝜃. 𝜃 may vary in 𝑋 without interfering with 
the identification of 𝛾𝐷 if utility is additively separable in 𝐻 and 𝑍𝐷. 
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effect of the propensity to divorce on financial hardship may include the 
effects of both anticipatory and predicted reactive behavior due to the 
coarseness of our timing, we will refer to it as the effect of anticipatory 
behavior for the sake of brevity. Our hardship equation is therefore 
𝐻 = 𝛼𝐻 + 𝑋𝛽𝐻 + 𝑍𝐻𝛾𝐻 + 𝜃𝐷 + 𝜑𝐷
∗ + 𝜀𝐻 (3) 
Since unobserved variables may affect both the propensity for divorce 
and financial hardship, we assume 
(𝜀𝐷 , 𝜀𝐻)
′ ~ 𝑁[0, 𝑆] (4) 
𝑆 ≡ [
𝜎𝐷
2 𝜎𝐻𝐷
𝜎𝐻𝐷 𝜎𝐻
2 ] 
 
(5) 
We are particularly interested in the off-diagonal element 𝜎𝐻𝐷 or the 
associated correlation 𝜌 ≡ 𝜎𝐻𝐷 (𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐷)⁄ . Since our hardship variable is the log 
income/needs ratio, a measure of wellbeing, a positive correlation would 
imply either that divorce and more comfortable household incomes just 
happen to occur together or that some unobserved factor is positively 
correlated with both the event of divorce and higher income/needs ratios. 
Likewise, if the correlation is negative we have a spurious relationship 
between divorce and hardship, such as some unobserved factor that is 
positively correlated with divorce but negatively correlated with the 
income/needs ratio.  
This structural model nests several models of interest. If ρ≠ 0 and 𝜑 =
𝛿 = 0, we have a typical selection model, i.e. one with no simultaneity. The 
model with 𝜑 = 0 and 𝛿 ≠ 0 is a selection model in which divorce only affects 
hardship through its actual occurrence, but hardship affects the propensity 
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to divorce. Similarly, the model with 𝜑 ≠ 0 and 𝛿 = 0 is a selection model in 
which both the event of and the propensity to divorce affects hardship, but 
hardship has no effect on divorce. Finally, the model with 𝜑 ≠ 0 and 𝛿 ≠ 0 is a 
selection model with full simultaneity, to which we now proceed.  
III.b. Reduced Form Model 
The structural model defined in (2) and (3) may be written in reduced 
form as  
[
𝐷∗
𝐻0
] = [
1 −𝛿
−𝜑 1
]
−1
[
𝛼𝐷 + 𝑋𝛽𝐷 + 𝑍𝐷𝛾𝐷 + 𝜀𝐷
𝛼𝐻 + 𝑋𝛽𝐻 + 𝑍𝐻𝛾𝐻 + 𝜀𝐻
] 
 
(6) 
Thus, we can define parameters 𝐴𝑗, 𝐵𝑗, 𝐶𝑗, 𝐹𝑗, and 𝑢𝑗 with 𝑗𝜖{𝐻, 𝐷} such 
that 
𝐷∗ = 𝐴𝐷 + 𝑋𝐵𝐷 + 𝑍𝐷𝐶𝐷 + 𝑍𝐻𝐹𝐷 + 𝑢𝐷              (7) 
𝐻 = 𝐴𝐻 + 𝑋𝐵𝐻 + 𝑍𝐷𝐶𝐻 + 𝑍𝐻𝐹𝐻 + 𝜃𝐷 + 𝑢𝐻 , (8) 
where, e.g., 
𝐵𝐻 = (𝜑𝛽𝐷 + 𝛽𝐻) (1 − 𝛿𝜑)⁄  
and 
[
𝑢𝐷
𝑢𝐻
] =
1
(1 − 𝛿𝜑)
[
1 𝛿
𝜑 1
] [
𝜀𝐷
𝜀𝐻
] ~ 𝑁[0, 𝛴] 
 
(9) 
𝛴 ≡ (
1
(1 − 𝛿𝜑)
)
2
[
1 𝛿
𝜑 1
] 𝑆 [
1 𝜑
𝛿 1
] 
 
(10) 
III.c. Estimation 
The parameters of the reduced-form system can be consistently 
estimated using what Maddala (1983) calls a switching regression model. 
Under the normalizing assumption that 𝛴11 = 1, the coefficients in equation 
(7) correspond to the parameters of a probit model. In principle, one could 
then estimate the model through a two-step procedure, i.e., estimate a 
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probit on divorce and use the resulting estimates to construct for each 
observation the inverse Mills’ ratios 𝜆+(𝑥) ≡ 𝜑(𝑥) 𝛷(𝑥)⁄  and 𝜆−(𝑥) ≡
−𝜑(𝑥) (1 − 𝛷(𝑥))⁄ , where 𝜑 is the density of the standard normal distribution, 
and 𝛷 is its cumulative distribution. Since 
𝐸(𝐻|𝑋, 𝑍𝐷 , 𝑍𝐻 , 𝐷 = 1) = 𝐴𝐻 + 𝜃 + 𝑋𝐵𝐻 + 𝑍𝐷𝐶𝐻 + 𝑍𝐻𝐹𝐻 + 𝛴12𝜆
+ (11) 
𝐸(𝐻|𝑋, 𝑍𝐷 , 𝑍𝐻 , 𝐷 = 0) = 𝐴𝐻 + 𝑋𝐵𝐻 + 𝑍𝐷𝐶𝐻 + 𝑍𝐻𝐹𝐻 + 𝛴12𝜆
−         (12) 
one can then construct 𝜆 = 𝐷𝜆+ + (1 − 𝐷)𝜆− to consistently estimate the 
parameters of 
𝐻 = 𝐴𝐻 + 𝜃𝐷 + 𝑋𝐵𝐻 + 𝑍𝐷𝐶𝐻 + 𝑍𝐻𝐹𝐻 + 𝛴12𝜆 + 𝑢𝐻 (13) 
However, rather than following such a two-step method, we shall 
estimate the model through limited information maximum likelihood (LIML).  
III.d. Identification 
Finally, we must recover the parameters of the structural model from 
the estimated parameters of the reduced form model. Our estimate of 𝜃 is 
provided by the estimation procedure directly. Assuming just identification, 
the feedback parameters are given by 
?̂? = ?̂?𝐻 ?̂?𝐷⁄  (14) 
𝛿 = ?̂?𝐷 ?̂?𝐻⁄  (15) 
The remaining structural parameters can be produced through similar 
linear combinations of the estimated reduced-form parameters, e.g. 
?̂?𝐻 = ?̂?𝐻 − ?̂?𝐷 ?̂?𝐻 ?̂?𝐷⁄   
Lastly, we must recover the structural covariance matrix through 
inversion of (10). 
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?̂? = [
1 −𝛿
−?̂? 1
] ?̂? [
1 −?̂?
−?̂? 1
]
= [
1 − 2𝛿?̂?12 + 𝛿
2?̂?22 (1 + 𝛿?̂?)?̂?12 − 𝛿?̂?22 − ?̂?
(1 + 𝛿?̂?)?̂?12 − 𝛿?̂?22 − ?̂? ?̂?22 − 2?̂??̂?12 + ?̂?
2
] 
 
 
(16) 
 
 
Note that under this specification, the exclusion restriction on the 
divorce instruments in the structural equations provides identification of 𝜑, 
the effect of the propensity of divorce on hardship, but 𝜃, the effect of the 
actual event of divorce (𝐷) on hardship, can only be separately identified 
through functional form assumptions. This is unavoidable if we wish to 
measure the effect of the propensity to divorce (𝐷∗) on hardship, and if we 
wish to separate out the effect of any anticipatory behavior from the 
reduced-form error covariance when we calculate the structural error 
correlation (ρ). 
One alternative would be to reserve our exclusion restriction for the 
identification of 𝜃 by imposing the restriction 𝜑 = 0 (i.e., excluding 𝑍𝐷 from 
the reduced-form 𝐻 equation). While this is the usual approach, note that in 
this application such a restriction excludes a potentially important response 
for which there is already some empirical evidence. Moreover, in practice 
that restriction also causes substantial changes in estimates of the structural 
correlation ρ, leading one to draw qualitatively different conclusions about 
the causal role of unobserved factors. Thus, while we shall present estimates 
both with and without imposing that restriction, we are more inclined to 
accept the insights from the unrestricted model. 
 27 
 
Fortunately, we will find that estimates of 𝜃 are very similar regardless 
of whether that restriction is imposed. Moreover, the restriction makes 
almost no difference at all in the reduced form estimates of the other 
parameters. It thus appears that, in this particular application, there is very 
little practical cost to obtaining identification through the functional form 
assumptions,10 particularly considering that it provides the benefit of 
allowing us to distinguish the effect of an important, otherwise unobservable 
channel. 
IV. Data 
Our primary data source is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 
1979 Cohort (NLSY79). The NLSY79, as the name suggests, is a longitudinal 
survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics on individuals who 
were 14-22 years of age in 1979. The longitudinal study consists of annual 
surveys up to 1994 and biennial surveys thereafter. These surveys cover a 
variety of topics, including demographics, fertility, education, labor market 
outcomes, and family structure. The original sample contained 12,686 
respondents. The retention rate for the primary subsample remained above 
90% until 1993, fell to 81% by 2000, and by 2014 has reached 
approximately 70%, or 79% if those respondents who are believed to be 
                                                          
10 This is to be expected. Our hardship variable, the log income/needs ratio, is a log 
transformation of household income. Since income is widely accepted to be approximately 
lognormally distributed, our functional form assumption in this case is not only plausible, 
but in this case is empirically supported by prior evidence. This point is discussed further in 
the following section. 
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deceased are excluded. Considering that the task here is tracking a set of 
individuals for 35 years, 80% retention by the end of that period among the 
living respondents is quite high. 
There are several advantages to using a longitudinal study for the 
study of family formation and dissolution. First, the use of a longitudinal 
study eliminates cohort effects, because the study is limited to a single 
cohort by design. Additionally, the use of a panel allows us to incorporate 
information about how an individual’s circumstances change over time. To 
the extent that divorce is not an instantaneous phenomenon, we may exploit 
exogenous variation which occurs over a period of time, which may be more 
relevant for long-term decision making than the associated measure in any 
one period, to estimate causal effects. Finally, having access to a full panel 
means that we will not inadvertently exclude any highly volatile marriages 
which may form and dissolve between waves of other surveys. 
Our subsample of interest consists of 2,598 women in the survey year 
in which they report becoming married for the first time since their last 
survey. These individuals are identified using a combination of the “number 
of spouses” variable for each year and the marital status variable, which 
unfortunately do not always agree with one another. The difference between 
the marital history variables appears to be that the number of spouses is the 
individual’s highest total number of spouses within that year, whereas their 
marital status is their marital status as of the survey, so there exists a 
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discrepancy in the variables if the individual was married within the year but 
after the survey date. For consistency with the timing of the other survey 
variables, if the reported total number of spouses increases from 0 to 1 in a 
survey year, and their marital status for that year indicates that they are 
married, then we assign that person to the subsample for that year. 
However, if the reported total number of spouses increases from 0 to 1 in a 
year, but their marital status does not change to married until the next year, 
then they are added to our subsample with the following year as their year 
of marriage. 
We observe 40% of our sample reporting the dissolution of their first 
marriage within the first 30 years. While this is slightly smaller than we 
would expect from comparable estimates produced by Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2007), a member of this sample would have had to have married 
early for 30 years to have elapsed since the time of their first marriage. 
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of these divorces. As we can discern from 
Figure 2, the median divorce occurs after 7 years, which would suggest that 
the use of an 8-year interval would be appropriate. As an added benefit, an 
8-year interval covers much of a typical business cycle during this period, so 
our hardship instrument will be less susceptible to temporary fluctuations 
and more representative of the overall state of the local economy inhabited 
by the couple under this choice of interval. We will also explore the usage of 
 30 
 
a 6-year interval, as several other studies on divorce have utilized this 
interval length. 
Some previous research has included marriages beyond the first. We 
have opted to exclude these higher order marriages because their inclusion 
would necessitate the use of controls for the number of previous marriages 
in order to account for any causal effects of previous divorces. 
Unfortunately, any variation due to unobserved factors that produced the 
prior divorces would be “explained” by the number of prior marriages, which 
would confound our ability to measure selection on unobserved variation. 
Our first dependent variable, 𝐷, equals 1 if, within 8 years of marriage 
(or 7 years for marriage years 1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993, for which 8 
years later is not a survey year11), the individual changes their marital status 
to divorced. Our instrument for divorce, 𝑍𝐷, the sex of the first child, has 
been used extensively as an instrument in the divorce literature (see Bedard 
and Deschênes (2005) and Dahl and Moretti (2008), as well as the bevy of 
sociological studies discussed therein). We define 𝑍𝐷 = 1 if the couple has a 
child and that first child is female, and 0 otherwise. Since the decision to 
have a child is very likely endogenous, we include an additional indicator 
variable which equals 1 if the couple has at least one child. Children are 
assigned as belonging to a couple if they are born during the marriage, or up 
                                                          
11 An indicator for whether the period for an individual is seven years long was included in 
our regressions to control for any potential bias from uneven period lengths, but it was 
nowhere significant, and has been omitted from the results. 
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to one year before. Unfortunately, the NLSY79 documentation indicates that 
the fertility data for men is known to be inaccurate. Since this precludes the 
use of this instrument in estimating divorce and hardship equations for the 
male respondents, we have reluctantly omitted men from our analysis. 
While this instrument has been widely used, we should acknowledge 
the recent critique by Hamoudi and Nobles (2014), who argue that male 
fetuses are more likely than female fetuses to miscarry in times of stress. 
However, this concern is likely to be considerably less relevant for the young 
women in our sample than it would be for the relatively older women studied 
by Hamoudi and Nobles.12 Regardless, the sign on the estimated coefficient 
on the sex of the first child in our reduced-form hardship equation (𝐶𝐻) is 
opposite to that predicted by their proposed source of bias, so if anything 
this would cause us to underestimate the effect of propensity to divorce on 
hardship.  
An important question in instrumental-variable approaches is for whom 
this instrument is relevant, which informs the interpretation of the local 
average treatment effect. Table 3 presents select coefficient estimates for 
probit regressions of the form 
Pr (𝐷 = 1) = 𝛷(𝛽0 + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝑍𝛽2) (17) 
                                                          
12 Still, in recognition of the fact that it would be particularly problematic for our 
identification strategy if our instrument for financial hardship predicted the sex of the first 
child: we checked, and it does not. 
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using both the 6 and 8-year intervals. In columns 2-4 we interact the 
sex-of-child instrument with different proxies for socioeconomic status: age 
at first marriage, years of education, and race respectively.  
A few clear patterns emerge in Table 3. First, many well-established 
predictors of divorce do not predict divorce as strongly as expected under 
the 6-year interval, suggesting that for many of these marriages, the 
processes which produce divorce have often not yet completed by the end of 
that interval. Secondly, in columns 2-4, we observe that the effect of the 
sex-of-child instrument is decreasing in the proxies for socioeconomic status. 
This indicates the instrument is most relevant for low socioeconomic status 
women, which corroborates a similar finding by Bedard and Deschênes 
(2005). This is an important group because these women are those most 
likely to be on the margin of poverty.  
Son preference appears to be weaker for white women or women who 
marry later. However, under either interval duration, the marginal effect of a 
female first child on the probability of divorce is nowhere significantly 
negative for white women, nor for any reasonable value of age at first 
marriage. Nor do we observe evidence of defiers by education. While we 
observe the most heterogeneity in the response to treatment by education, 
an examination of the marginal effects of sex-of-child by education category 
on the probability of divorce revealed no category for which we would reject 
the hypothesis of no defiers. 
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Other potential instruments for divorce were considered, including 
local area sex ratios by industry and occupation (see Svarer (2007)); 
however, none proved to be sufficiently strong in the divorce equation to 
function as instruments.  
For our continuous hardship variable, 𝐻, we use the log income/needs 
ratio at the end of the 8-year period (or the 7-year period for marriage years 
1987, 1989, 1991, and 1993). The income/needs ratio is constructed from 
total net family income by subtracting transfer payments and dividing it by 
the poverty level for a family of that size in that year, as defined by the U.S. 
Census Bureau. This measure functions as a good index of hardship as it 
reflects the available incoming resources per family member. Furthermore, it 
is sufficiently comprehensive as an index of household financial wellbeing 
that it accommodates most reasonable assumptions required for 
identification. Finally, the distribution of income is well-studied, and this 
transformation conforms to our functional form assumptions, which 
facilitates identification. One drawback of using this definition of hardship is 
that we are only indexing hardship by income, so we will not capture any 
effect of, e.g., profligate spending on divorce except possibly through the 
error correlation 𝜌. 
The instrument (𝑍𝐻) we use for 𝐻 is the average unemployment rate 
within the respondent’s county of residence over the 7 or 8-year period, as 
reported in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment 
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Statistics. We match these county-level unemployment rates to individual 
person records in each year using the NLSY79 Geocode File. In Table 4, we 
repeat the relevancy exercise above, estimating via OLS equations of the 
form 
𝐻 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝛼1 + 𝑍𝛼2 + 𝑢 (18) 
We again see some evidence of heterogeneity by education, with 
income in educated households much less responsive to changes in local 
economic conditions as measured by the local unemployment rate.  
To further verify our distributional assumptions, Figure 3 plots the 
histogram of the residuals of the model in Table 4, Column 1. Apart from the 
lower tail outliers in the vicinity of -10, this appears to be a good, if slightly 
leptokurtic, approximation of the normal distribution. We will also present 
results in which a floor of -5 has been imposed on the log income/needs 
ratio, which will show that our results are robust to the presence of these 
outliers. 
We additionally include controls for year of marriage, labor supply for 
both the respondent and her husband, the respondent’s tenure at her 
current job, the respondent’s age at this first marriage, the husband’s age13, 
the respondent’s race, the couple’s family size, the respondent’s education in 
years and their Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) score, 
                                                          
13 Interacted with an indicator for whether the husband’s age was missing, as it is in a 
minority of cases. 
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personality indices for self-esteem and locus of control, and finally a set of 
dummies interacting region with urban/rural status. These independent 
variables all use the values from the year in which the marriage was 
reported. Note that since the NLSY79 is primarily focused upon tracking the 
respondent, we are unable to include variables for match quality, like if the 
respondent and her husband share the same religion. Select summary 
statistics are provided in Table 5.  
As we can see in Table 5, the individuals in this sample are fairly 
representative of the cohort. The average age at first marriage among 
women is about 24, 88% of respondents are white, just over half of first 
children are girls, most have only completed high school, and about 22% of 
these marriages end in divorce within the first 7 or 8 years. Notably, there is 
a reduction in the proportion of minority respondents in the 8-year interval 
as compared to the 6-year interval. Inclusion in our sample requires, at a 
minimum, observations on both the first year of marriage and the final year 
of the interval. Unfortunately, 38% of Black and Hispanic oversample 
respondents were not surveyed in 2000, a year more likely to be included in 
the longer interval from first marriage.  
Our identifying assumptions are that, conditional on these covariates, 
the local unemployment rate is uncorrelated with divorce outcomes other 
than through its effect on financial wellbeing, and that future household 
income is not influenced by the sex of the first child other than through the 
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propensity to divorce. For example, Lundberg and Rose (2002) find that 
sons increase men’s labor supply, but they argue that this may be operating 
through a decreased propensity to divorce increasing the returns to marital-
specific investments, including specialization, so this effect would not violate 
these assumptions.  
V. Results 
We present the structural parameters of interest in Table 6. The four 
specifications vary in whether we imposed the restriction 𝜑 = 0, and whether 
we imposed a floor on the log income/needs ratio. Estimates for the effect of 
hardship on the propensity to divorce (𝛿) are difficult to interpret because 
they are effectively measured in utils, but since they are near 0 in all 
specifications we simply report their p-values. Since the results are 
substantially similar within columns (apart from differences that follow 
immediately from the restriction 𝜑 = 0), we shall discuss only the first set of 
estimates. Tables 7-10 present reduced form estimates of each specification.  
The only structural parameter provided directly by this estimation 
procedure is 𝜃, and we see from that estimate that the event of divorce 
produces on average a 0.32 standard deviation decrease in log 
income/needs ratio by the end of the period. The interpretation in this 
context is that in the absence of anticipatory behavior, the average divorced 
woman would see her household income/needs ratio fall to 55% of its 
previous level. This is roughly equivalent to the loss of a second earner. We 
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should also note that this estimate contrasts with Bedard and Deschênes’ 
(2005) conclusion that divorce raises women’s incomes. 
We proceed with our recovered structural parameters beginning with 
the effect of the propensity to divorce on hardship, which we have labeled 𝜑. 
In the divorce equation our instrument for divorce, the sex of the first child, 
is strong with a chi-squared value of 11.29. Our estimated value of 𝜑 of 
0.642 is significant at the 10% level. For the purposes of interpretation, 
consider a woman in our sample at the baseline probability of divorce of 
0.22 who got married at the age of 24 and an otherwise comparable woman 
who got married at the age of 22. The otherwise comparable woman would 
have a probability of divorce of 0.25. Based upon our estimates, we would 
expect her to engage in some anticipatory behavior which would increase 
her log income/needs ratio by 6.5% in response to this 13.7% increase in 
her risk of divorce, which is a modest response to a worrisome increase in 
divorce risk.  
Similarly, the additional divorce risk required to induce an anticipatory 
response large enough to offset the negative effect of divorce is gigantic. For 
example, a near tripling of the divorce risk across the baseline, from a 
probability of 0.11 to a probability of 0.31, would be sufficient to almost fully 
compensate for the event of divorce. Needless to say, there is no intuitive 
example that can be drawn from our parameter estimates which would 
correspond to so large an increase. 
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Bedard and Deschênes (2005) attribute their IV estimates to 
anticipatory labor supply responses, and our estimated anticipatory effect 
appears to be operating through this same channel. Figure 4 plots residuals 
of an OLS regression of end of period hours worked on ASVAB scores, race 
dummies, education, ASVAB scores, and beginning of period hours worked 
on the vertical axis against predicted probabilities of divorce on the 
horizontal axis. As we can see from the figure, the residual change in hours 
worked is slightly increasing in the predicted probability divorce, again 
suggesting a modest labor supply response. 
Much of the anticipatory response may instead take the form of 
occupational upgrading. Table 11 presents the most common beginning of 
period and end of period occupational categories for women with below 
median and above median predicted probabilities of divorce. We observe 
women with low predicted probabilities of divorce moving out of the labor 
force, whereas those with high probabilities of divorce are entering the labor 
force and moving from part-time occupations into more full-time roles. This 
suggests that the anticipatory response consist of more than simply 
increasing how many hours are being worked; women with high divorce 
probabilities are also more likely to move to higher-paying jobs. 
Our instrument for log income/needs ratio is semi-weak in the 
hardship equation with a chi-squared value of 5.54, but it is not at all 
significant in the divorce equation. More than insignificant, the marginal 
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effect of a full point increase in the local unemployment rate is a decrease in 
the probability of divorce by 0.26 percentage points, or roughly 1.2% of the 
baseline probability of divorce in the period, and we can rule out any effect 
larger than 4.3% of the baseline. Consequently, we conclude that the 
estimated value for 𝛿, the causal effect of financial hardship on divorce, is 
effectively 0. Since this is a local average treatment effect, we can infer from 
this result that financial strain from variation in local economic conditions 
does not increase the risk of divorce. This finding is consistent with that of 
Charles and Stephens (2004), who find that job losses due to an exogenous 
factor, in their case plant closings, have no effect on the probability of 
divorce. 
Finally, we are interested to know the correlation between the 
structural errors. Proceeding under the assumption 𝛿 = 0, as we will for the 
remainder of our study, we calculate 
𝜎𝐻𝐷
𝜎𝐻𝜎𝐷
=
?̂?12 − ?̂?
√?̂?22 − 2?̂??̂?12 + ?̂?2
≈ −0.366 
This suggests the presence of some unobserved factor which produces 
both divorce and financial hardship, the presence of which was masked by 
anticipatory behavior. While we can only speculate on the source of this 
negative selection, one can certainly imagine any number of stories in which 
personality traits which are not rewarded on the labor market would be also 
maladaptive in a marriage. However, we can exclude from the list of 
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potential sources any story which involves narcissism or external loci of 
control, as we have included controls for these traits. 
VI. Policy Extension 
The above findings invite a number of policy questions. First, Voena 
(2015) finds that the institution of unilateral divorce laws in states where 
property is divided according to a community property rule, which is where 
all assets are divided evenly between separating spouses, is associated with 
increased asset accumulation and lower female labor force participation. 
These differences are respectively attributed to husbands insuring against 
the expected loss of assets, and wives receiving an increased share of 
household resources due to changes in intra-household bargaining from the 
introduction of unilateral divorce.  
We would be interested to know if women also purchase this 
insurance, demonstrating a stronger anticipatory response in community 
property states to increases in divorce risk than in non-community property 
states, and if women who cannot be insured against this risk (either through 
their own actions or those of their husbands) experience worse divorce 
outcomes. To examine this question, we proceed as above, stratifying the 
sample by divorce regime. We estimate separate regressions for community 
property states,14 unilateral divorce states that do not operate under a 
community property regime, and mutual consent divorce states that do not 
                                                          
14 Except for Louisiana, all states with community property laws also allow unilateral divorce. 
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operate under a community property regime. These categories are assigned 
at their value in year of the woman’s marriage according to Online Appendix 
F in Voena (2015). Table 12 presents the structural parameters of interest 
from these regressions. 
While not particularly robust to the presence of outliers, we can 
conclude from these results that women in non-community property states 
that allow unilateral divorce are much more negatively affected by divorce 
than women in mutual consent or community property states. It also 
appears as though those women positively select into divorce, and although 
our point estimate of the effect of propensity to divorce is near 0, we cannot 
rule out the possibility that this estimated positive selection may be driven 
by meaningful levels of anticipatory behavior due to imprecision in these 
estimates. Thus, while we can conclude from these results that many of the 
divorced women in our sample who suffer the most negative financial 
outcomes reside in states with unilateral divorce but without equal division 
of property, we unfortunately lack the statistical power to explore this 
difference further. 
Another policy question of interest is whether government transfer 
programs are effective in offsetting the hardship of divorce. To explore this 
question, Table 13 presents our structural parameters of interest for 
regressions using four different dependent variables: the first is our log 
income/needs ratio from above, the second is the log income/needs ratio 
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with transfer payments included, the third uses log total transfer income, 
and the fourth uses log Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) payments. We have also 
attempted these estimates with the restriction 𝜑 = 0; however, as in every 
other case presented here, the only substantive difference is the 
interpretation of the structural error correlation term, which again would be 
effectively 0 under this restriction. The full reduced form estimates using the 
latter three dependent variables are presented in Tables 14-16. 
From these results, it is clear that transfer programs, mainly AFDC and 
TANF, reduce the overall hardship from divorce, and that the anticipatory 
labor supply response may decrease reliance on public assistance. 
Furthermore, we do observe some evidence of selection, that those who are 
more likely to divorce tend to receive higher levels of public assistance 
overall, but not necessarily higher levels of AFDC. However, we cannot 
conclude without first identifying the source of the selection effect whether 
this selection effect between divorce and transfer payments is related to the 
previously identified selection effect between divorce and financial hardship. 
VII. Conclusion 
We set out to examine the direction of causality in the well-
documented correlation between financial hardship and divorce. We found 
that financial hardship as defined as household income adjusted for the 
needs of a household of that size has no causal effect on the probability of 
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divorce. We also find that divorce imposes a financial hardship on women in 
the form of a 0.32 standard deviation decrease in their income/needs ratio, 
and that after correcting for the effect of anticipatory behavior, which 
appears to take the form of a modest labor supply response, we find some 
evidence of negative selection on unobservables. 
In our policy extension, we found that women in states with unilateral 
divorce but without equal division of property tend to experience much more 
negative divorce outcomes than women in other states. Additionally, we 
found that government transfer programs, in particular Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families, are effective in alleviating the hardship from 
divorce, and that the anticipatory labor supply response to elevated divorce 
risk may reduce reliance on transfer programs. 
These findings suggest a few avenues in need of future research. First, 
while we have concluded that there is no causal effect of financial hardship 
as defined by income, we have not examined the possibility that there is a 
causal relationship between profligacy and divorce as some of the literature 
suggests. Secondly, while we have identified some selection on 
unobservables, we are only able to exclude stories based on locus of control 
and self-esteem, and were unable to discern the nature of the relationship, if 
any, between the selection effects in our log income/needs ratio estimates 
and those in our transfer income estimates. Finally, while we have examined 
a few policy questions, we were unable to fully examine the relationship 
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between divorce policy regime and the effect of divorce on women’s 
wellbeing
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Percentage Changes in SSDI Awards and Average Annual 
Unemployment Rate (1987-2015) 
 
Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics; Social Security Administration, Annual Statistical Report 
on the Social Security Disability Insurance Program (2015) 
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Figure 2. PDF of Divorce 
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Figure 3. Histogram of OLS Hardship Residuals 
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Figure 4. Plot of Residual Change in Hours Worked 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Decomposition of Change in SSDI Enrollment Rate, 2006-2008 to 
2009-2012 
 Change in composition Change in rates Total 
Total 0.066 0.096 0.162 
Labor force participants -0.037 0.041 0.004 
Unemployed 0.030 0.017 0.047 
Previously Disabled 0.005 0.004 0.009 
Exited labor force 0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
Did not exit 0.002 0.009 0.011 
Non-disabled 0.025 0.013 0.038 
Exited labor force 0.006 0.006 0.012 
Did not exit 0.019 0.007 0.026 
No unemployment -0.066 0.024 -0.042 
Previously Disabled -0.039 0.015 -0.011 
Exited labor force -0.023 2.2x10-4 -0.023 
Did not exit -0.016 0.014 0.002 
Non-disabled -0.027 0.010 -0.017 
Exited labor force -0.006 0.003 -0.003 
Did not exit -0.022 0.007 -0.015 
Labor force non-participants 0.103 0.055 0.158 
Previously Disabled 0.046 0.044 0.090 
Non-disabled 0.057 0.011 0.068 
Values presented are percentage point differences rounded to three decimal places, and have been 
tabulated using person weights. 
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Table 2. Decomposition of Change in SSDI Enrollment Rate by Income and 
Education 
 100% of Poverty Level 200% of Poverty Level High School Dropout 
Total 0.164 0.167 0.167 
Low income 0.029 0.058 -0.006 
Change in Composition 0.061 0.105 -0.010 
Change in Rates -0.032 -0.048 0.004 
Higher Income 0.135 0.110 0.173 
Change in composition 0.021 -0.017 0.079 
Change in Rates 0.114 0.126 0.094 
Values presented are percentage point differences rounded to three decimal places, and have been 
tabulated using person weights. The discrepancy in the thousandths of a percentage point in the 
totals is due to rounding error. 
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Table 3. Probit Estimates of Divorce 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
6-Year Interval     
Age -0.036* 
(0.019) 
-0.025 
(0.020) 
-0.37* 
(0.020) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
Education -0.035 
(0.023) 
-0.032 
(0.023) 
0.007 
(0.025) 
-0.037 
(0.023) 
White 0.163* 
(0.091) 
0.160* 
(0.091) 
0.140 
(0.091) 
0.258** 
(0.109) 
Female First Child 0.121 
(0.085) 
1.173** 
(0.488) 
1.942*** 
(0.471) 
0.338*** 
(0.129) 
Age*Female First 
Child 
 -0.047** 
(0.022) 
  
Education*Female 
First Child 
  -0.143*** 
(0.036) 
 
White*Female First 
Child 
   -0.258* 
(0.144) 
𝛸2 2.01 6.82 17.35 7.63 
n 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 
8-Year Interval     
Age -0.049*** 
(0.019) 
-0.039** 
(0.020) 
-0.049*** 
(0.019) 
-0.049*** 
(0.019) 
Education -0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.044* 
(0.023) 
-0.016 
(0.026) 
-0.048** 
(0.023) 
White 0.192** 
(0.086) 
0.190** 
(0.086) 
0.179** 
(0.086) 
0.267** 
(0.106) 
Female First Child 0.235*** 
(0.081) 
1.015** 
(0.440) 
1.350*** 
(0.454) 
0.394*** 
(0.121) 
Age*Female First 
Child 
 -0.035* 
(0.019) 
  
Education*Female 
First Child 
  -0.087** 
(0.035) 
 
White*Female First 
Child 
   -0.187 
(0.139) 
𝛸2 8.40 11.50 14.14 13.92 
n 2,442 2,442 2,442 2,442 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Χ2 in the first column reports the individual Χ2 statistic for 
Female First Child, and in columns 2-4 reports the joint significance of Female First Child 
and the interaction term. All regressions are weighted using sampling weights, and 
include the additional controls discussed in section III. 
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Table 4. OLS Estimates of Hardship 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
6-Year Interval     
Age -0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.059** 
(0.026) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
Education 0.137*** 
(0.016) 
0.136*** 
(0.016) 
0.039 
(0.041) 
0.137*** 
(0.016) 
White 0.423*** 
(0.090) 
0.441*** 
(0.089) 
(0.434*** 
(0.090) 
0.421** 
(0.202) 
Average 
Unemployment 
-0.048*** 
(0.017) 
-0.187** 
(0.091) 
-0.240*** 
(0.085) 
-0.048** 
(0.023) 
Age*Average 
Unemployment 
 0.006* 
(0.003) 
  
Education*Average 
Unemployment 
  0.015*** 
(0.006) 
 
White*Average 
Unemployment 
   0.0003 
(0.030) 
𝐹 7.90 4.12 4.68 4.85 
n 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 
8-Year Interval     
Age -0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.055* 
(0.031) 
-0.015 
(0.020) 
0.015 
(0.20) 
Education 0.162*** 
(0.028) 
0.163*** 
(0.028) 
0.069 
(0.064) 
0.162*** 
(0.028) 
White 0.502*** 
(0.114) 
0.520*** 
(0.113) 
0.508*** 
(0.113) 
0.592** 
(0.234) 
Average 
Unemployment 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.172** 
(0.087) 
-0.218** 
(0.108) 
-0.020 
(0.024) 
Age*Average 
Unemployment 
 0.006* 
(0.004) 
  
Education*Average 
Unemployment 
  0.015* 
(0.008) 
 
White*Average 
Unemployment 
   -0.012 
(0.030) 
𝐹 3.16 2.60 2.32 1.58 
n 2,442 2,442 2,442 2,442 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. F in the first column reports the individual F-statistic for 
Average Unemployment, and in columns 2-4 reports the joint significance of Average 
Unemployment and the interaction term. All regressions are weighted using sampling 
weights, and include the additional controls discussed in section III. 
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Table 5. Select Summary Statistics 
Variable 6-Year Interval 8-Year Interval 
 Mean 
(Standard deviation) 
ln(Income/Needs) 0.675 
(1.922) 
0.881 
(1.840) 
Age at First Marriage 23.909 
(5.061) 
24.266 
(5.207) 
Family Size 2.740 
(1.374) 
2.518 
(1.120) 
ASVAB 46.195 
(28.161) 
53.857 
(27.356) 
Years of Education 12.958 
(2.257) 
13.283 
(2.267) 
Hours Worked in Past Year 1372.59 
(856.845) 
1479.56 
(821.704) 
Tenure at Current Job in 
Weeks 
91.429 
(135.858) 
102.910 
(148.605) 
Weeks Worked by Husband 
in Past Calendar Year 
45.763 
(12.488) 
46.104 
(11.968) 
Average Unemployment Rate 7.423 
(2.900) 
6.927 
(2.585) 
 Proportion 
Pr(Divorce) 0.183 0.222 
Pr(Has Children) 0.720 0.764 
Pr(Has Girl | Has Children) 0.512 0.522 
White 0.624 0.843 
Black 0.214 0.103 
Hispanic 0.162 0.054 
n 2,598 2,442 
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Table 6. Structural Parameters of Interest 
Variable No Floor, 
𝝋 ≠ 𝟎 
No Floor, 
𝝋 = 𝟎 
With Floor, 
𝝋 ≠ 𝟎 
With Floor, 
𝝋 = 𝟎 
Direct Effect of 
Divorce: 𝜃 
-0.590** 
(0.240) 
-0.504** 
(0.221) 
-0.463*** 
(0.179) 
-0.398** 
(0.166) 
Anticipatory 
Effect: 𝜑 
0.642* 
(0.373) 
0 0.426* 
(0.259) 
0 
Effect of 
Hardship on 
Divorce: 𝛿 
 
𝑝 = 0.476 
 
𝑝 = 0.466 
 
𝑝 = 0.460 
 
𝑝 = 0.447 
Structural Error 
Correlation: 𝜌 
-0.366* 
(0.188) 
-0.023 
(0.074) 
-0.357* 
(0.188) 
-0.036 
(0.081) 
Log-likelihood -5772 -5774 -4901 -4903 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
  
 55 
 
Table 7. Reduced Form Estimates of 𝝋 ≠ 𝟎 Specification with No Floor 
Variable Divorce ln(Income/Needs) 
Constant 13.102 
(30.918) 
38.260 
(32.833) 
Divorce -- -0.590** 
(0.240) 
Age at First Marriage -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.022 
(0.017) 
Husband Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Black -0.140 
(0.113) 
-0.696*** 
(0.124) 
Hispanic -0.268* 
(0.142) 
-0.254 
(0.156) 
Family Size -0.013 
(0.029) 
-0.066** 
(0.033) 
ASVAB -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Education -0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.157*** 
(0.021) 
Rotter Score 0.007 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -0.010 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
Husband Weeks Worked 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Hours Worked 2.97E-5 
(4.42E-5) 
4.20E-4*** 
(4.72E-5) 
Weeks of Tenure -0.001*** 
(3.60E-4) 
1.45E-4 
(2.75E-4) 
Has Child -0.913*** 
(0.080) 
-0.645*** 
(0.109) 
First Child Sex 0.235*** 
(0.070) 
0.151** 
(0.075) 
Average Unemployment Rate -0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.034** 
(0.015) 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
?̂?12 0.006 
(0.131) 
√?̂?22 
1.616*** 
(0.023) 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Regression is weighted using sampling weights. 
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Table 8. Reduced Form Estimates of 𝝋 = 𝟎 Specification with No Floor 
Variable Divorce ln(Income/Needs) 
Constant 13.303 
(30.914) 
38.292 
(32.864) 
Divorce -- -0.504** 
(0.221) 
Age at First Marriage -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.021 
(0.017) 
Husband Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Black -0.140 
(0.113) 
-0.697*** 
(0.124) 
Hispanic -0.268* 
(0.142) 
-0.255 
(0.156) 
Family Size -0.013 
(0.029) 
-0.065** 
(0.033) 
ASVAB -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Education -0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.158*** 
(0.021) 
Rotter Score 0.007 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.015) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -0.010 
(0.008) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
Husband Weeks Worked 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Hours Worked 2.98E-5 
(4.42E-5) 
4.22E-4*** 
(4.73E-5) 
Weeks of Tenure -0.001*** 
(3.60E-4) 
1.52E-4 
(2.74E-4) 
Has Child -0.915*** 
(0.080) 
-0.552*** 
(0.097) 
First Child Sex 0.237*** 
(0.070) 
-- 
Average Unemployment Rate -0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.034** 
(0.015) 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
?̂?12 -0.037 
(0.120) 
√?̂?22 
1.618*** 
(0.023) 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Regression is weighted using sampling weights. 
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Table 9. Reduced Form Estimates of 𝝋 ≠ 𝟎 Specification with Floor 
Variable Divorce ln(Income/Needs) 
Constant 13.160 
(30.912) 
32.945 
(22.983) 
Divorce -- -0.463*** 
(0.179) 
Age at First Marriage -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
Husband Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Black -0.140 
(0.113) 
-0.505*** 
(0.087) 
Hispanic -0.268* 
(0.142) 
-0.160 
(0.109) 
Family Size -0.013 
(0.029) 
-0.053** 
(0.023) 
ASVAB -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Education -0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.126*** 
(0.014) 
Rotter Score 0.007 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -0.010 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
Husband Weeks Worked 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Hours Worked 2.97E-5 
(4.42E-5) 
3.11E-4*** 
(3.31E-5) 
Weeks of Tenure -0.001*** 
(3.61E-4) 
7.79E-5 
(1.93E-4) 
Has Child -0.914*** 
(0.080) 
-0.537*** 
(0.078) 
First Child Sex 0.235*** 
(0.070) 
0.100* 
(0.053) 
Average Unemployment Rate -0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.036*** 
(0.010) 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
?̂?12 -0.007 
(0.099) 
√?̂?22 
1.131*** 
(0.016) 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Regression is weighted using sampling weights. 
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Table 10. Reduced Form Estimates of 𝝋 = 𝟎 Specification with Floor 
Variable Divorce ln(Income/Needs) 
Constant 13.256 
(30.908) 
32.951 
(23.007) 
Divorce -- -0.398** 
(0.166) 
Age at First Marriage -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
Husband Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
Black -0.140 
(0.113) 
-0.506*** 
(0.087) 
Hispanic -0.268* 
(0.142) 
-0.160 
(0.109) 
Family Size -0.013 
(0.029) 
-0.052** 
(0.023) 
ASVAB -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Education -0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.127*** 
(0.014) 
Rotter Score 0.007 
(0.014) 
0.003 
(0.011) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -0.010 
(0.008) 
0.026*** 
(0.006) 
Husband Weeks Worked 0.003 
(0.003) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Hours Worked 2.98E-5 
(4.42E-5) 
3.12E-4*** 
(3.31E-5) 
Weeks of Tenure -0.001*** 
(3.60E-4) 
8.43E-5 
(1.93E-4) 
Has Child -0.916*** 
(0.080) 
-0.474*** 
(0.070) 
First Child Sex 0.238 
(0.070) 
-- 
Average Unemployment Rate -0.011 
(0.014) 
-0.035*** 
(0.010) 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
?̂?12 -0.041 
(0.091) 
√?̂?22 
1.132*** 
(0.016) 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Regression is weighted using sampling weights. 
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Table 11. Occupation Categories by Divorce Probability 
Occupation Category Start of Period Proportions End of Period Proportions 
Below Average Predicted Probability of Divorce 
None 0.120 0.214 
Management 0.064 0.098 
Education 0.068 0.074 
Food Preparation and Service 0.027 0.031 
Sales 0.074 0.055 
Office Support 0.258 0.169 
Production 0.058 0.041 
Above Average Predicted Probability of Divorce 
None 0.290 0.239 
Management 0.041 0.071 
Education 0.020 0.030 
Food Preparation and Service 0.116 0.058 
Sales 0.119 0.074 
Office Support 0.167 0.203 
Production 0.064 0.071 
 
  
 
6
0
 
Table 12. Structural Parameters of Interest by Divorce Regime 
Variable Community 
Property 
Community 
Property with 
Floor 
Unilateral, 
Non-
Community 
Property 
Unilateral, 
Non-
Community 
Property with 
Floor 
Mutual 
Consent, Non-
Community 
Property 
Mutual 
Consent, Non-
Community 
Property with 
Floor 
𝜑 ≠ 0       
Direct Effect of 
Divorce: 𝜃 
-0.712 
(0.566) 
-0.465 
(0.366) 
-2.280*** 
(0.333) 
-1.419*** 
(0.424) 
-0.261 
(0.305) 
-0.209 
(0.250) 
Anticipatory 
Effect: 𝜑 
1.593 
(1.763) 
1.064 
(1.120) 
0.180 
(0.447) 
-0.062 
(0.298) 
1.414 
(0.899) 
1.083 
(0.691) 
Structural Error 
Correlation: 𝜌 
-0.681 
(0.424) 
-0.678 
(0.424) 
0.422* 
(0.220) 
0.442** 
(0.223) 
-0.708*** 
(0.216) 
-0.724*** 
(0.207) 
Log-likelihood -1574 -1326 -1970 -1631 -2115 -1842 
𝜑 = 0       
Direct Effect of 
Divorce: 𝜃 
-0.584 
(0.549) 
-0.386 
(0.362) 
-2.257*** 
(0.336) 
-1.448*** 
(0.363) 
-0.129 
(0.281) 
-0.086 
(0.228) 
Anticipatory 
Effect: 𝜑 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Structural Error 
Correlation: 𝜌 
-0.005 
(0.187) 
-0.017 
(0.180) 
0.497*** 
(0.092) 
0.412** 
(0.167) 
-0.082 
(0.097) 
-0.118 
(0.107) 
Log-likelihood -1575 -1327 -1970 -1632 -2119 -1845 
n 654 821 944 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 13. Transfer Income Structural Parameters of Interest 
Variable Log 
Income/Needs 
Log 
Income/Needs 
with Transfers 
Log Transfer 
Income 
Log 
AFDC/TANF 
Income 
Direct Effect of 
Divorce: 𝜃 
-0.590** 
(0.240) 
-0.332 
(0.409) 
0.384 
(0.331) 
0.842*** 
(0.162) 
Anticipatory 
Effect: 𝜑 
0.642* 
(0.373) 
0.355 
(0.270) 
-0.914 
(0.580) 
-0.189 
(0.315) 
Structural Error 
Correlation: 𝜌 
-0.366* 
(0.188) 
-0.273 
(0.218) 
0.380** 
(0.180) 
0.123 
(0.197) 
Log-likelihood -5772 -5003 -6895 -5699 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 14. Reduced Form Estimates with Log Income/Needs with Transfers 
Variable Divorce ln(Income/Needs) 
Constant 9.765 
(30.602) 
38.203 
(23.967) 
Divorce -- -0.332 
(0.409) 
Age at First Marriage -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
Husband Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
1.08E-4 
(0.003) 
Black -0.140 
(0.113) 
-0.436*** 
(0.092) 
Hispanic -0.279** 
(0.141) 
-0.119 
(0.118) 
Family Size -0.013 
(0.029) 
-0.023 
(0.024) 
ASVAB -0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
Education -0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.130*** 
(0.016) 
Rotter Score 0.007 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.011) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -0.010 
(0.008) 
0.024*** 
(0.007) 
Husband Weeks Worked 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
Hours Worked 3.49E-5 
(4.39E-5) 
2.37E-4*** 
(3.45E-5) 
Weeks of Tenure -0.001*** 
(3.66E-4) 
2.41E-5 
(2.10E-4) 
Has Child -0.914*** 
(0.080) 
-0.432*** 
(0.126) 
First Child Sex 0.235*** 
(0.070) 
0.083 
(0.059) 
Average Unemployment Rate -- -0.018* 
(0.011) 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
?̂?12 0.021 
(0.236) 
√?̂?22 
1.180*** 
(0.017) 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Regression is weighted using sampling weights. 
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Table 15. Reduced Form Estimates with Log Transfer Income  
Variable Divorce ln(Transfer Income) 
Constant 9.932 
(30.593) 
-55.752 
(52.031) 
Divorce -- 0.384 
(0.331) 
Age at First Marriage -0.050*** 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(0.027) 
Husband Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
Black -0.139 
(0.113) 
0.246 
(0.197) 
Hispanic -0.276* 
(0.141) 
0.183 
(0.246) 
Family Size -0.014 
(0.029) 
0.140*** 
(0.052) 
ASVAB -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Education -0.047** 
(0.020) 
-0.139*** 
(0.032) 
Rotter Score 0.007 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.024) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.024* 
(0.014) 
Husband Weeks Worked 0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.016*** 
(0.004) 
Hours Worked 3.42E-5 
(4.37E-5) 
-3.24E-4* 
(7.48E-5) 
Weeks of Tenure -0.001*** 
(3.60E-4) 
-5.54E-4 
(4.35E-4) 
Has Child -0.917*** 
(0.080) 
0.394** 
(0.166) 
First Child Sex 0.237*** 
(0.070) 
-0.217* 
(0.119) 
Average Unemployment Rate -- 0.056** 
(0.023) 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
?̂?12 0.138 
(0.177) 
√?̂?22 
2.561*** 
(0.037) 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Regression is weighted using sampling weights. 
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Table 16. Reduced Form Estimates with Log AFDC Income 
Variable Divorce ln(AFDC) 
Constant 9.862 
(30.588) 
-10.220 
(31.866) 
Divorce -- 0.842*** 
(0.162) 
Age at First Marriage -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
0.025 
(0.017) 
Husband Age -0.008** 
(0.004) 
-1.53E-4 
(0.004) 
Black -0.140 
(0.113) 
0.172 
(0.120) 
Hispanic -0.279** 
(0.141) 
0.107 
(0.150) 
Family Size -0.013 
(0.029) 
0.114*** 
(0.032) 
ASVAB -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
Education -0.048** 
(0.020) 
-0.050** 
(0.020) 
Rotter Score 0.007 
(0.014) 
0.011 
(0.015) 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale -0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.013 
(0.009) 
Husband Weeks Worked 0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.012*** 
(0.003) 
Hours Worked 3.47E-5 
(4.37E-5) 
-2.58E-4*** 
(4.58E-5) 
Weeks of Tenure -0.001*** 
(3.60E-4) 
-3.20E-4 
(2.65E-4) 
Has Child -0.915*** 
(0.080) 
0.467*** 
(0.096) 
First Child Sex 0.235*** 
(0.070) 
-0.044 
(0.073) 
Average Unemployment Rate -- 0.041*** 
(0.014) 
Year Yes Yes 
Region Yes Yes 
?̂?12 0.005 
(0.082) 
√?̂?22 
1.569*** 
(0.022) 
*,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Regression is weighted using sampling weights. 
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